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ST. JOHIN'S LAW REVIEW
unfortunately not in a climate unfavorable to such a continued evolu-
tion in our criminal law. The incompatibility of this decision with the
equal protection clause, the due process clause, and the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution is obvious, and awaits the greater influence of
a more enlightened philosophy of criminal justice.
TAXATION - PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS - IRS RECOGNIZES
CORPORATE STATUS. - Technical Information Release No. 1019, 2
CCH Corporation Law Guide 11;482 (August 19, 1969).
Although courts have attempted to define corporate status since
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' the issue seems to have
arisen in a tax context only since the passage of the Revenue Act of
1894.2 Subsequently, Congress sought to provide legislative guidelines
for the determination of corporate status for federal tax purposes.3
Unfortunately, however, each of these attempts proved unsuccessful;
the meaning of the term "corporation" remained uncertain. More
importantly, the relationship between state incorporation statutes and
corporate status under federal income tax legislation was never ex-
plored. Nevertheless, there seemed to be little difficulty in the tax treat-
ment of corporations designated as such.
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), wherein Chief Justice John Marshall defined a
corporation as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or
as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated
to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by
which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and
may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own
affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous
and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it
from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in
succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented,
and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable
of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.
Id. at 636.
2 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 849, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. While exempting partnerships,
this Act treated corporations and associations alike by imposing a 2 percent tax on
their income. The legislative history preceding passage of this Act indicates a distinction
between corporations and associations on the one hand, and partnerships on the other.
26 CoNe. REc. 6866, 6867 (1894) (remarks of Mr. Hoar). Furthermore, the debates reveal
some sentiment for treating associations organized under state law as "quasi-corporations."
Id. at 6838 (remarks of Mr. Vest).
3 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057. The congressional debates
preceding the passage of the Act indicate that the term "corporation" included asso-
ciations, which were defined as a number of people associated together whether or not
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Indeed, this area was notable for its lack of controversy until
Morrissey v. Commissioner4 was decided in 1955. In Morrissey the Gov-
ernment attempted to impose corporate status upon a real estate trust.
The Commissioner sought to continue the prevailing practice5 of char-
acterizing organizations whose status was in doubt, i.e., business trusts,
as associations, which were treated as corporations for federal income
tax purposes.6 The United States Supreme Court adopted his conten-
tions, holding that a trust, although not incorporated under state law,
should be taxed as a corporation since it possessed more of the at-
tributes or characteristics of a corporation than a non-corporation.7
Although Morrissey is cited as leading authority in determining
whether an entity should be treated as a corporation for tax purposes,
it is Pelton v. Commissioner8 which is of primary interest in the
they were incorporated. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 1111, 47 Stat. 289. See, e.g., 56
CONG. REc. 10,418 (1918) (remarks of Mr. Garner). Thus, it is interesting to note that
the 1918 Act defined the term "corporation" in a manner substantially similar to that of
the present code. It was this Act which distinguished personal service corporations from
other corporations and treated them as partnerships, although this special treatment
was to have effect for only three years. Today, the definition of the term "corporation"
is contained in section 7701 of the 1954 Code:
§ 7701. Definitions
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or
manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof-
(1) Person. - The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.
(2) Partnership and partner. - The term "partnership" includes a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through
or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is
carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or
estate or a corporation; and the term "partner" includes a member in such
a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organization.
(3) Corporation. -The term "corporation" includes associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies.
(b) Includes and Including.-The terms "includes" and "including" when
used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude
other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.
Ir. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(l)-(3), (b).
4296 U.S. 344 (1935).
5 See Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations,
49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 640, 653-57 (1965).
6 See note 2 supra; Comment, Can Professionals Incorporate for Tax Purposes?, 33
ALBANY L. Rv. 311, 314 (1969).
7The Morrissey Court found a trust analogous to a corporate organization for
federal tax purposes when the following criteria were satisfied:
(I) the "corporation, as an entity, holds the title to the property,"
(2) "centralized management through representatives of members of the corporation,"
(3) security from "termination or interruption by the death of owners of beneficial
interests,"
(4) "[transferability of] beneficial interests without affecting the continuity of the
enterprise," and
(5) "limitation of the personal liability of participants to the property embarked in the
undertaking." 296 U.S. at 359.
8 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
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context of professional associations. There, the court, adopting the
Morrissey rationale, imposed what has come to be termed the "pre-
ponderance of attributes" or "substantial resemblances"9 measure to
a group of physicians operating a clinic as a trust. Thus, it was deter-
mined that a trust composed entirely of professionals could be treated
as an association, and hence, taxed as a corporation.
Subsequent to the Pelton case, the economic philosophy under-
lying federal tax legislation underwent significant alteration. While
prior tax treatment of corporations had generally been more onerous
than that of partnerships and individuals,10 Congress deviated from this
course of conduct in 1938 when it imposed a flat tax rate of 20 percent
on net corporate income in excess of $25,000.11 This new rate, repre-
senting a 40 percent reduction in the maximum tax rate of such corpora-
tions,12 when supplemented by a sharply rising progressive tax rate
on individual income, 13 soon demonstrated the advantages of corporate
tax treatment.
9 Id. at 476.
10 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27, 32, 28 Stat. 553, 556. This Act imposed a 2
percent tax on corporate and individual income, but exempted $4,000 of individual and
partnership income from taxation. The Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, placed
a 1 percent tax on net income over $5,000 for every corporation and association.
Partnerships were excluded from the effects of this tax.
111939-1 Cum. BULL. 780, pt. II.
12 Id.
13 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 103, 56 Stat. 802-03. The double taxation provision
applicable to corporate income (taxation of income as it accrues to the corporation and
taxation of shareholders' income received in the form of salary and dividends) which
initially made the corporate tax burden more onerous, has been mitigated by the different
tax rates applicable to partnerships and corporations, and by the availability of certain
deductions discussed below. While a partner is taxed at the progressive personal income
tax rate, even on undistributed income of the partnership, a corporate employee would
pay the personal tax rate only on salary and income that was actually distributed to him.
Though the corporation would be taxed on its income, it is taxed at a lower rate -
22 percent of its income up to $25,000 and 48 percent of its income above
this amount. See Comment, Tax Relief for Professional Service Organizations, 73 Dica.
L. REv. 486 (1969). By the device of an employment contract, an employee can spread
his income over a lifetime, thus avoiding a high tax rate in a few high income producing
years. See Scallen, supra note 5, at 604 n-3. Deferral of taxation can also be accomplished
through pension or profit sharing plans, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-07, whereby
the corporation may deduct its contribution to the plan even though the employee
is not taxed on the contribution until it is actually distributed to him. Id. §§ 402-
(a)(1), 406(a). Although Congress has enacted a similar plan for self-employed in-
dividuals and partnerships, it is not as advantageous as the corporate plan. See
Comment, supra, at 487-88; Comment, supra note 6, at 313. A corporation may purchase
group life, accident, disability, medical and hospital insurance for its employees, and
deduct such premiums when computing its federal income taxes without the employees
being taxed on the premiums paid for them. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §§ 105(d), 106;
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-.2(d)(2). T.D. 6272, 11-25-57, 1966-2 Cur. BULL. 23-24. Similarly,
corporations may establish death benefit plans whereby an employee's widow
will receive up to $5,000 which is not taxable as income to her, but can be deducted by
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This economic incentive was readily discernible in United States
v. Kintner,'4 wherein the roles of the Commissioner and the taxpayer
were reversed on the _question of taxing noncorporate entities as cor-
porations. Prior to 1948, plaintiff physician had practiced as a member
of a partnership; however, in that year, the partnership was dissolved
and the partners executed "Articles of Association," providing that
"the members 'associate themselves together for the practice of med-
icine and surgery as an unincorporated association', which was to
be endowed with the 'attributes of a corporation' and to be 'treated as
a corporation for the purposes of taxation.' "15 The Commissioner,
resisting the application of such advantageous corporate tax treatment
to an unincorporated business, entered a deficiency determination
against the plaintiffs. The taxpayers then instituted an action in the
District Court of Montana seeking to recover that deficiency assess-
ment. The Commissioner responded with the identical argument ad-
vanced by the physicians in Pelton: since doctors were unable to
incorporate under state law, their association could not be regarded as
a corporation under federal income tax legislation.16 The district court
rejected this contention,17 and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
admitting:
The laws of Montana do not include the practice of medicine as
one of the purposes for which a corporation may be organized.
Montana Civil Code, 1935, Sec. 5902. And it may be assumed that
its courts would infer from this statute an intention to prohibit a
corporation from practicing medicine.' 8
However, rejecting the argument that local law should govern, the
court applied the criteria enunciated in Morrissey and held that a
qualifying association would be treated as a corporation.' 9
the corporation. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 402(a)(2). In addition, corporate employees are
covered by Workmen's Compensation, the income of which is tax free. See Brief for
Medical Group Management Association as Amicus Curiae at 3, O'Neill v. United States,
410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
14216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
15 Id. at 420.
16Id. at 421-22. See also Scallen supra note 5, at 63940.
17 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
18216 F.2d at 421.
19 Id. at 422. Quoting the Pelton court, it stated:
It is obvious from this record that petitioners' enterprise was carried on for profit,
and it is likewise dear that all the substantial points of resemblance to a corpo-
ration as specified in the decisions mentioned were present in their organization.
On the other hand, substantial dissimilarities to the partnership form appear.
Petitioners have called our attention to a recent decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court, People [by Kerner] v. United Medical Service, 362 IM. 442, 200 N.E. 157, in
which it was held that a corporation may not practice medicine in Illinois.
However, we think that Article 1503 of Regulations 65 and 69 sufficiently covers
1969]
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In response to this judicial setback, the Commissioner, in an ob-
vious effort to discourage professional incorporation as an avoidance
device,20 promulgated the Kintner Regulations.2 1 The applicable por-
tions of these Regulations provide:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local law
which establishes the tests or standards which will be applied in
determining the classification in which an organization belongs,
local law governs in determining whether the legal relationships
which have been established in the formation of an organization
are such that the standards are met. Thus, it is local law which
must be applied in determining such matters as the legal relation-
ships of the members of the organization among themselves and
with the public at large, and the interests of the members of the
organization in its assets.22
The Commissioner then enumerated specific standards2a which were
this situation in providing that "organizations . . . are . . . associations
within the meaning of the statute even though under state law such organizations
are technically partnerships.
Id., quoting 82 F.2d at 476.
Additionally, the Government's position was undermined by its own regulations. See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-1 (1935); Treas. Reg. III, §§ 29.3797-2, 29.3797-A(1949). Of par-
ticular note are the Treasury Regulations applicable to the definition of an "assodation."
The term "association" is not used in the Internal Revenue Code in any narrow or
technical sense. It includes any organization, created for the transaction of designated
affairs, or the attainment of some object, which, like a corporation, continues notwith-
standing that its members or participants change, and the affairs of which, like
corporate affairs, are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board, or some
other group, acting in a representative capacity. It is immaterial whether such organiza-
tion is created by an agreement, a declaration of trust, a statute, or otherwise. Treas.
Reg. III, § 29.3797-2 (1949). In regard to partnerships, the Regulations provided:
If an organization is not interrupted by the death of a member or by a change in
ownership of a participating interest during the agreed period of its existence,
and its management is centralized in one or more persons in their respective
capacities, such an organization is an association, taxable as a corporation.
Id. § 29.3797-.4.
Thus it is apparent that the only criteria separating partnerships from associations
were continuity of existence and centralization of management. See Scallen, supra note 5,
at 662, 664. The Articles of Association in Kintner seemed designed to meet these
criteria. 216 F.2d at 420. See also Commissioner v. Fortney Oil Co., 125 F.2d 995 (6th Cir.
1942).
20 See note 23 inffa.
21 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-301.7701-11 (1960).
22Id. § 301.7701-1(c) (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the Kintner
court, in rejecting the Commissioner's contentions regarding state law, had stated:
It should be added that it would introduce an anarchic element in federal
taxation if we determined the nature of associations by State criteria rather than
by special criteria sanctioned by the tax law, the regulations and the courts.
It would destroy the uniformity so essential to a federal tax system,- a unifor-
mity which calls for equal treatment of taxpayers, no matter in what State their
activities are carried on. For it would mean that tax incidences as to taxpayers
in the same category would be determined differently according to the law of the
State of residence.
216 F.2d at 424.
23 The characteristics which an unincorporated organization must possess in order
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to be utilized in determining whether the organization in question
contained "more corporate characteristics than noncorporate char-
acteristics. '24 Additionally, the Regulations provided that characteristics
common to both corporate and noncorporate entities should not be
considered in determining whether a particular organization qualified
for corporate tax treatment.25
Professional groups, recognizing the stringency of these Regula-
tions,26 responded by inducing state legislatures to enact either a profes-
sional corporation or professional association act.27 Although such acts
present two different routes to the identical goal, the common aim has
been to minimize taxes by seeking corporate status. In turn, the Com-
missioner, reversing his previous position on the matter of state law
in an attempt to counteract such measures, promulgated certain
to achieve classification as a corporation for federal tax purposes are associates, an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, continuity of life, central-
ization of management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(2)-(e) (1960).
24Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
25Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are
essential characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for profit . . .
the absence of either of these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement
among co-owners of property for the development of such property for the
separate profit of each not to be classified as an association. Some of the major
characteristics of a corporation are common to trusts and corporations, and
others are common to partnerships and corporations. Characteristics common to
trusts and corporations are not material in attempting to distinguish between a
trust and an association, and characteristics common to partnerships and corpora-
tions are not material in attempting to distinguish between an association and a
partnership. For example, since centralization of management, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and limited liability are generally common to
trusts and corporations, the determination of whether a trust which has such
characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an association
depends on whether there are associates and an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains therefrom. On the other hand, since associates and an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom are generally
common to both corporations and partnerships, the determination of whether an
organization which has such characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a
partnership or as an association depends on whether there exists centralization of
management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and limited
liability.
Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2).
20 As a result of the emphasis which the Kintner Regulations placed upon criteria
applied technically under local law, it became impossible for an organization which was
characterized as a partnership under local law to obtain corporate status under the federal
income tax laws. Scallen, supra note 5, at 605. But see Foreman v. United States, 232
F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
27See, e.g., FLA. STAT., ch. 621 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-4318 (1968); OHIo
Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01-.02 (Page 1967). Forty-seven states have enacted professional
service corporation or association laws for one or more professional groups. 7 CCH STAND.
FED. TAx REP. 8094 (1969). See also Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal In-
Come Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. Rav. 1 (1961). Professor
Bittker distinguishes between professional association statutes and professional corporation
statutes. In discussing these statutes, Mr. Scallen distinguishes a third approach-that of
Colorado, "where a rule of civil procedure provides that attorneys may practice in the
corporate form .... " Scallen, supra note 5, at 609.
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amendments to the Kintner Regulations. 28 In pertinent part they
provide:
[T]he labels applied by local law to organizations, which may now
or hereafter may be authorized by local law, are in and of them-
selves of no importance in the classification of such organizations
for the purposes of classification under the Internal Revenue
Code.29
Additionally, the amendments sought to establish separate criteria for
professional service organizations."
As a consequence of the amended Regulations, a substantial body
of case law began to evolve.3' In Empey v. United States32 a group of
attorneys utilized a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 3 to organize a
professional service corporation under the Colorado Corporation
Code.3 4 Although Empey, a member of the corporation, initially had
paid his taxes as if it were a partnership, he subsequently filed a daim
for a refund of the tax. When the Commissioner failed to take any
action on the claim within six months after it was filed, Empey com-
menced this action.3 5 The trial court found for the plaintiff, holding
that the Regulations involved were inconsistent with the statutory
definition of corporations and partnerships and the judicial construc-
tion thereof. Moreover, as the Regulations constituted the exercise
of a nondelegable legislative function, they were invalid and unen-
forceable. Finally, the court held that even if the Regulations were
valid, the organization in question more nearly resembled a corpora-
tion than a partnership. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
stating:
28 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d), (g)-(h) (1965).
29 Id. at § 301.7701-1(c). Cf. note 20 supra and accompanying text.
3old. at § 301.7701-2(h). This criteria rendered it practically impossible for a profes-
sional association to qualify as a corporation for federal tax purposes. For example, Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1(h)(2) (1965) provides that a professional service organization lacks
continuity of life within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, professional
disqualification, or election to inconsistent public office of any member will
(determined without regard to any agreement among the members) cause under
local law the dissolution of the organization.
Similarly, subsection (h)(4) provides:
If under local law and the rules pertaining to professional practice, a mutual
agency relationship, similar to that existing in an ordinary professional partner-
ship, exists between the members of a professional service organization, such
organization lacks the corporate characteristic of limited liability.
31 See note 52 infra.
32 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969). For an interesting treatment of Empey, see Ray,
Court Upholds Professional Corporation: Kintner Regulations Declared Invalid, 27 J.
TAx. 270 (1967).
83 COLO. R. Civ. P. 265.
34 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 1-10 (1963).
35 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
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There has been no substantial change in the definition of the term
"corporation" and the term "partnership" since the Revente Act
of 1932, and the definitions of those terms in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 are identical with their definitions in the Revenue
Act of 1939. The definition of a partnership, by its language,
plainly refers to unincorporated organizations. To treat as a part-
nership for federal income tax purposes a corporation, organized
and chartered under state laws as a corporation and operated as
such in good faith, does violence to the statutory definitions of the
terms "partnership" and "corporation," to long followed admin-
istrative practice prior to 1965, and to the decided cases dealing
with analogous organizations. Moreover, Congress has not seen
fit to take any legislative action to overturn such long standing
practices and decisions, and the Treasury Department only under-
took to do so by a greatly belated Regulation.
We conclude the 1965 Regulations are "unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes," and are therefore
invalid. Moreover, we think the 1965 Regulations "amount to an
attempt to legislate" and are therefore invalid.3 6
In Kurzner v. United States,37 the Fifth Circuit applied the "pre-
ponderance of attributes" test under the original Kintner Regulations
to a substantially similar situation. Since the medical group seeking
status as a corporation for tax purposes satisfied the criteria established
by these Regulations, the result was identical to Empey. In addition,
however, the Kurzner court found the 1965 amendments invalid as
"bold attempts . . . to avoid judicial decisions . . . [and] arbitrary,
discriminatory, and legislative in nature."3 8
In their successful challenges to the Kintner amendments both
Empey and Kurzner relied upon state incorporation acts. However, in
O'Neill v. United States,3 9 the petitioners were organized under a state
association act. Plaintiff O'Neill was a shareholder, director and
employee of Drs. Hill and Thomas Company, a medical association
which had practiced in the partnership form for fifty-five years, but
was reorganized in 1963 as an association under the Ohio Professional
Associations Act.40 In his return for the fiscal year ending January 31,
36406 F.2d at 170 (footnotes omitted). The court cited both Commissioner v. South
Texas Lumber Co., 383 U.S. 496, 501 (1948), and Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co., 318 U.S.
206, 311-12 (1943).
37 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAx CAs. (69-1, at 84, 765) 9428 (5th Cir.
May 27, 1969).
38 Id. at 84,777.
39 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Holder v. United States, 289 V. Supp. 160
(N.D. Ga. 1968), wherein a medical association organized under the Georgia Professional
Associations Act, GA. CODE ANN. ch. 84-43 (1961), was regarded as possessing the necessary
attributes to qualify as a "corporation" for federal tax purposes.
40 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01-.08 (Page 1964). Section 1785.08 incorporates by
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1966, the taxpayer reported and paid taxes on the amount of income
of the company which would have been taxable to him had it been a
partnership. When his timely claim for refund was not granted, the
taxpayer commenced this action in the district court. Characterizing
Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2(h) as an administrative overreaching
without support in the law, that court entered judgment for the tax-
payer, concluding that under Regulation § 301.7701-2(a-f) the company
was a corporation for federal tax purposes. 41 And it was further held
that the company should be regarded as a corporation under Ohio
law.4
2
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the primary
issue was one of statutory construction:
Did Congress in the statutes from 1918 to the present, when it used
identical language with respect to the term "corporation," mean
that some state chartered corporations should not be treated as
corporations for federal income tax purposes? 43
The Government argued that in order to be a corporation for
federal tax purposes a state chartered corporation must be tested
against the criteria established in Morrissey. The court, carefully
distinguishing Morrissey, rejected this contention:
In Morrissey the question was whether a trust created for the de-
velopment of a tract of land was an "association" under federal
tax law and hence taxable as a corporation. The Court was not
called on to define a corporation for purposes of federal taxation.
Since the Court was not defining the word "corporation" and was
dealing with a trust, it did not mention such characteristics of a
corporation as existence by virtue of a charter granted by the
sovereign, status as a legal entity separate from its owners, and
being a person in contemplation of law.
... The Morrissey case did not deal with the definition of "corpo-
ration" under the statute, and we hold that it in no way supports
the position of the Government that a corporation under state
law must meet a test of resemblance to some federal standard of
reference chapter 1701 of the General Corporation Law, insofar as it does not conflict
with the Professional Association Law.
Drs. Hill & Thomas Company provided in its articles of association that (I) shares
of the company were limited to licensed physicians, (2) shares could be transferred only
with written consent of the company, and (3) upon termination of employment, all out-
standing shares would be offered to the company. 410 F.2d at 898-99.
41 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
42 Id.
43 410 F.2d at 890.
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corporateness, before it will be taxed as a corporation under fed-
eral law.44
The Government's reliance upon statutory definitions and legisla-
tive history was also rejected. In regard to the former, the court noted
that since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1919, the term "corpo-
ration" has encompassed "associations, joint-stock companies, and
insurance companies." 45 Analogizing to the Code sections which afford
special treatment to personal service corporations, 4 it contended that
Congress intended that they be taxed as corporations unless otherwise
explicitly provided. 47 And the legislative history was viewed as exhibit-
ing a congressional intent to include within the term "corporation"
all associations whether or not incorporated. 4
The circuit court then examined the Government's reliance upon
the "interpretive regulations" of the Treasury Department, noting that
"not until the 1960 promulgation of Treasury Regulations § 301.7701-
l(c) was there any indication that a state created corporate entity
might not be a corporation under 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a)(3)." 49 It quickly
rejected the Government's contention "that associations are taxed as
corporations because they meet the test of 'associations' under federal
tax law,"50 and to the extent that the Regulations supported this
position, characterized them as an invalid attempt to legislateSl
44 Id. at 891.
45 Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057, 1058 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 7701(a)(d)).
46 See Second Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 757, §§ 101, 725, 502, 54 Stat. 974, 987, 1005;
Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, ch. 1199, § 101, 64 Stat. 1137, 1176.
47 410 F.2d at 892.
48 Id. at 893-94. Similarly, the court stated that the history of the revenue acts failed
to exhibit a congressional intent to exclude professional corporations or associations, as
defined under state law, from the "corporation" definition of section 7701(a)(3). Id. at 894.
Statutory history also evidenced congressional recognition that corporations, state-
created entities subject to no uniform law, would have varying characteristics, but made
no provision that these different qualities would affect their status for tax purposes. Id.
at 895.
49 410 F.2d at 894. See Bittker, supra note 27, at 25-26, wherein Professor Bittker dis-
cussed the possibility of applying the 1961 Regulations to organizations incorporated
under state law.
Do these "corporations" or "professional corporations" constitute "corporations"
as this term is used in the Internal Revenue Code? To the best of my knowledge,
this is a novel question in the sense that until now all organizations bearing the
label "corporation" under state law have, without further inquiry, been accorded
that status for federal income tax purposes, the only debate in this area having
been concerned with the classification of organizations that are not labelled
"corporations" by state law.Id.
Go 410 F.2d at 895. The court stated that "the absence of any indication that state
law corporations would be treated as anything other than corporations for federal tax
purposes may be taken as some indication that Congress used them as a definitional
lodestar." Id.
51 Id. The court noted that "[tlhe net effect of the Government's position with respect
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The "labeling" argument advanced by the Government was per-
haps its most persuasive.52 The Government urged that federal taxation
should not "turn on state labels attached to entities created under
state law, since that would vitiate the 'substance over form' principle
so firmly embedded in the law of federal taxation (see, e.g., Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 [55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596]) and lead to
rampant inequality of federal tax treatment." 53 It pointed out that
several states had enacted professional association acts under which
associations could not incorporate. Thus, two associations, identical in
all other respects, could be accorded varying treatment under the
federal income tax depending upon whether the particular state statute
involved permitted incorporation by an association. The court re-
sponded by noting that "some [tax] inequities have existed for many
years and Congress has seen fit to do nothing about them in terms of
enacting a more precise definition of 'corporation'." 54 Additionally, the
court observed:
[T]he particular tax inequities of which the Government here
complains may be regarded as a result of the 1960 and 1965
amendments to the Regulations which the Commissioner saw fit
to adopt after United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 413 (9th Cir.),
and the enactment of professional corporation and association
statutes by some of the state legislatures.55
While refusing to characterize its holding as the adoption of a "label-
ing" approach, the court clearly stated that "the inquiry is whether
the state granted existence to a corporate entity under its law." 56
The fact that the state limited the corporate properties which a
professional association might possess was regarded as having no bearing
under the Internal Revenue Code.57 Consequently, the Government's
contentions that the association lacked limited liability, freely trans-
ferable shares, centralization of management, and continuity of life
were unavailing.58 This rejection was consistent with the court's earlier
treatment of Morrissey; federal standards of corporateness were not
to the Company in this case of course is to create an exemption from corporate taxation
based on 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3)." Id. at 895 n.12.
52 For the Government's "labeling" argument, which this author feels is a valid one,
see Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 12-15, O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th
Cir. 1969).
53410 F.2d at 897.




58 Id. at 898-99.
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pertinent, the inquiry being limited to whether the association was a
corporation under state law. 9 The court concluded:
We hold that a corporation created under state law is a corpora-
tion within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(a)(3) and that
Treas. Reg. Secs. 301.7701-1(c) and 301.7701-2 are invalid insofar
as they require a corporation created under state law to be treated
as something other than a corporation for federal tax purposes.60
One might cogently argue that the line of cases culminating in
O'Neill6' firmly established that the judiciary would not sanction dis-
criminatory treatment of professional service organizations, and would
continue to invalidate the Treasury Regulations where they resulted
in a denial of the benefits of corporate tax status to those groups.
However, subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's decision in O'Neill, the
Internal Revenue Service's continued rejection of asserted corporate
status for professional service organizations resulted in another series
of court challenges to the Kintner Regulations.6 2 Once again, the
contention of the Commissioner that professional service organizations
59 Id. at 899. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that the court
erred in terminating its inquiry at this point. The "preponderance of attributes" test
should be an equal partner in arriving at a determination of whether an association such
as was involved in O'Neill should be taxed as a corporation. Bittker, sup-a note 27, at 8,
lends support to this contention. In distinguishing between professional corporations
statutes and professional associations statutes, he classifies the Ohio statute in the latter
category and states:
[A]lthough some of the provisions of the state corporation laws are made ap-
plicable to these groups, they also bear some earmarks of unincorporated groups
and their status under the Internal Revenue Code depends upon whether they
are "associations" within the meaning of section 7701(a)(3).
See also Bittker, Professional Service Organizations: A Reply, 24 TAx L. Rrv. 00 (1969);
Thies, Professional Service Organizations: A Comment, 24 TAx L. Rav. 291 (1969).
60410 F.2d at 899.
ol Empey v. United States, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969) (attorneys incorporated under
Colorado law held a corporation for tax purposes); Kurzner v. United States, CCH 1969
STAND. FED. TAx REP., U.S. TAx CAs. (69-1, at 84, 765) 9428 (5th Cir. May 27, 1969) (med-
ical group incorporated under Florida Professional Service Corporation Act held to meet
the corporate attributes of Treausry Regulations § 801.7702-2(a)-(g) and subsection (h) was
struck down); Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (medical group
formed under Arkansas Medical Corporation Act held to be entitled to tax treatment as a
corporation); Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (unincorporated
medical group organized under the Georgia Professional Association Act held to meet the
four basic criteria necessary for corporate tax status).
62 Williams v. United States, CCH 1969 STAND FED. TAX RE., US. TAx CAs. (69-2, at
85,820) 9519 (D. Minn. July 1, 1969) (medical clinic organized under Minnesota law
classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes); Ahola v. United States, CCH 1969
STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (69-2, at 85,823) 9520 (D. Minn. July 1, 1969) (med-
ical clinic operating as a business trust held taxable as a corporation because it satisfied
the Kintner Regulations' criteria for an association); Smith v. United States, CCH 1969
STAND. FE. TAx RaP., U.S. TAX CAs. (69-1, at 84,889) 9860 (D. Fla. April 14, 1969) (med-
ical group organized as a corporation under Florida law held taxable as such).
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must meet the more stringent criteria of the Treasury Regulations was
rejected by the courts.63 Finally, as a result of the numerous decisions
invalidating the so-called Kintner Regulations, the Service announced
a change in policy, conceding that "organizations of doctors, lawyers,
and other professional people organized under state professional asso-
ciation acts will, generally, be treated as corporations for tax pur-
poses."16 4 Under the abandoned approach, corporate status for federal
63 See cases cited note 62 supra.
64 Technical Information Release No. 1019, 2 CCH CoPP. LAW GumE 11,482
(August 19, 1969). The full text of the statement by the Internal Revenue Service appears
below.
The Internal Revenue Service announced today, in response to recent decisions
of the Federal courts, that it is conceding that organizations of doctors, lawyers,
and other professional people organized under state professional association acts
will, generally, be treated as corporations for tax purposes.
This action followed a decision not to apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari
in the recent cases of United States v. O'Neill [69-1 USTC 9372], F.2d (6th
Cir., May 1, 1969), aff'g 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), and Kurzner v. United
States [69-1 USTC 9428], F.2d (5th Cir., May 27, 1969) aff'g 286 F. Supp. 839
(S.D. Fla. 1968). This decision was made by the Solicitor General and concurred
in by the Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division) and the Commissioner and
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
Both of these decisions held that a group of doctors organized under state law
was classifiable as a corporation for Federal tax purposes. Obviously, however,
the government must reserve the right to conclude differently in any case that
reflects special circumstances not present in O'Neill or Kurzner.
An earlier decision had been made not to seek certiorari in U. S. v. Empey,
holding a group of lawyers organized under the general corporation laws of
Colorado to be a corporation for Federal tax purposes.
Nor will the government further press its appeals presently pending in the 5th
and 8th Circuits. These are respectively Holder v. United States [68-2 USTC
9504], 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Georgia 1968), and Wallace v. United States [68-2
USTC 9669], 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968). Also, no appeal will be
prosecuted in any other pending cases decided adversely to the government on
the same issue involving similar facts. Finally, all sinilar cases now in litigation
or under audit will be reviewed to see if they should be conceded.
Implementing instructions will be issued to field personnel-if necessary on
a state-by-state basis-as soon as possible. In addition, appropriate modifications
of existing regulations will be required consistent with these decisions.
This development has extremely broad implications for the professional element in
our society. The New York Times recently reported that "thousands of professional and
small corporations are being sought eagerly by mutual funds, insurance companies and to
a lesser extent by banks." Hershey, Professions Win Incorporation Right, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1969, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 12, col. 5.
In addition, it has been reported that the Service has unofficially begun to accept ap-
plications for approval of "prototype" benefit plans. Id. A prototype, submitted by a
sponsor organization, e.g., a mutual fund or insurance company, once approved, enables
a corporation to establish a qualified benefit plan by simply adopting and properly ap-
plying for it. Corporate employee-benefit plans, including pension and profit-sharing
programs, are generally regarded as superior to plans authorized by the Self-Employed
Individuals Retirement Act of 1962, commonly termed the Keogh Act, Pub. L. 87-799,
Oct. 10, 1962, 76 Stat. 809, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 37, 62, 72, 101, 104, 105, 172, 401-05,
503, 805, 1361, 2039, 2517, 3306, 3401, 6047, 7207 (1964). N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1969 § 3
(Business & Finance), at 12, col. 5. Under the latter program, a self-employed person is
permitted to deduct contributions to his own pension plan up to 10 percent of his income.
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tax purposes was conditioned upon possession of such corporate
characteristics as a business purpose, continuity of life, centralized
management, limited liability, and free transferability. Now, however,
in the vast majority of cases, compliance by a professional group with
appropriate state law will insure corporate treatment for tax purposes.
Although the Service retains the right to contest the asserted corporate
status of any group under special circumstances not present in O'Neill,
it is safe to assume that Technical Information Release No. 1019
represents a basic shift in service policy, and henceforth, professional
However, in no event can he deduct more than $2,500 per year. In addition, the taxpayer
must contribute a similar percentage for workers employed on a full-time basis for three
years. If a corporate plan is utilized, no dollar ceiling on contributions and deductions
is imposed, "and there is no requirement for immediate and full vesting on behalf of
covered employees." Id. at col. 6.
The benefits of incorporation were exemplified in a financial plan drawn up by a
business management consultant for a client who specialized in internal medicine.
Continuing in
solo practice
Gross practice income for one year .................... $176,700
Overhead costs ......................................-- 3000
Amount deducted for tax-sheltered investment plan .... - 2,500
All forms of insurance deductible .....................
not allowed
Net practice income .................................. $121,200
Tax bracket ......................................... 64%
Federal tax paid ...................................... $ 64,180
(a tax savings
Personal take-home pay .............................. $ 57,020
Deductible investments added back to indicate total per-
sonal income .................................... +2,500
Personal insurance .................................... -1,297
Net personal income (total assets) .....................
Investment projection: Keogh Plan to age 65 (23 years);
Corporate Plan (to age 65) ........................























Blakeslee, Physicians Profit from Tax Device, Id. § 1, at 64, cols. 2-3.
According to this analysis, the client, upon incorporation, will save $17,280 per year in
taxes, and will retire twenty-three years later on an income of $99,900 per year. While
incorporation would increase overhead costs, the client would be able to deduct ap-
proximately twenty per cent of gross income to put toward his retirement. In this manner
the physician could amass $1,665,200 in investments upon which he could draw as retire-
ment income at age sixty-five. Id. at col. 4.
Forty-eight states now permit some form of professional incorporation; New York,
Wyoming and the District of Columbia are the sole exceptions. The Times noted that
"in the last year in Albany, two enabling bills were defeated as legislators argued that
professional corporations would serve no other purpose other than to permit doctors to
enrich themselves at the expense of the state and Federal Governments." Id. at col. 3. It
has been noted, however, that a physician "who has half a million or a million dollars in
investments waiting for him at retirement is less likely to raise his fees...." Id. at col. 4.
Incorporation, then, may serve to inhibit the inflationary rise in the cost of medical
treatment.
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service organizations will enjoy the tax treatment accorded their
nonprofessional brethren as long as current law remains unchanged.6 5
65 It must be noted, however, that the Treasury Department is presently examining
the incorporation trend as part of a broad examination of deferred compensation plans.
Id. at col. 1. Furthermore, the Times has reported that "[t]he agency intends to present
legislation in 1970 that would seek to outlaw this practice and to deal with what it con-
siders to be other inequities in the tax treatment of retirement plans for employees and
the self-employed." Id. at col. 1. See also Wall St. Journal, Oct. 27, 1969, at 40, col. 2.
Additionally, various proposed changes in the Tax Reform Bill of 1969 will affect the
tax benefits available to professional corporations. For instance, section 541 of the Bill,
relating to Subchapter S corporations, provides that a shareholder-employee
must include in his gross income the contributions made by the corporation
under a qualified plan on his behalf to the extent the contributions exceed 10
percent of his salary or $2,500, whichever is less. Other employees who are share-
holders but own 5 percent or less of the stock in the subchapter S corporation are
not subject to this rule, and greater contributions may be made on their behalf
without any amount being included in their income,
H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 541 (1969).
The concern of the Department is readily apparent then. As a result, an element of
doubt continues to shade the future viability of professional incorporation.
